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Top-Down or from the Ground?: A Practical 
Perspective on Reforming the Field of Children and 
the Law 
Cheryl Bratt 
introduction 
Children get a raw deal in this country—at the federal, state, and family lev-
els. Consider, for example, the start of 2018, when Congress recast children as 
bargaining pieces, leveraging continued funding of the Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (CHIP) over extending deportation protections to the Dreamers.1 
While such debate raged in Washington, D.C., California police arrested two 
parents who had been horrifically torturing their thirteen children for years, un-
beknownst to the state.2 Headlines aside, the law indisputably treats children in 
many limiting and paternalistic ways, typically designating them as objects to be 
controlled either by their parents or the government—two parties perpetually 
duking it out for authority.3 
 
1. See Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, G.O.P. To Use Children’s Health Insurance as Lure for Averting 
Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/us/poli-
tics/government-shutdown-immigration-childrens-health.html [http://perma.cc/CU9S-
T3J3]. 
2. See, e.g., Madison Park et al., Found Shackled and Emaciated, Children of Torture Suspects  
Are Freed, CNN (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/16/us/california-turpin-13 
-siblings-held-captive/index.html [http://perma.cc/A7ZG-A9W6]. 
3. See generally, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, & STATE 2 (6th 
ed. 2009) (“Law outlines a framework for the distribution of decisional power among the 
child, the family, and various agencies of the state. Although the pattern of the law is complex, 
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Anne C. Dailey and Laura A. Rosenbury propose a seismic shi� to this cur-
rent framework in their article, The New Law of the Child. They advance a “new 
paradigm for describing, understanding, and shaping children’s relationship to 
the law,” which “values the extraordinary richness and variety of children’s lives” 
as they exist in the present, and not just as future adults.4 Specifically, they iden-
tify five “broader interests that the law should recognize and promote,”5 and de-
scribe a new “tripartite framework” to recenter the field of children and the law 
around these broader interests—their “new law of the child.”6 
Through their new framework, Dailey and Rosenbury envision overhauling 
constitutional law to better promote children’s broader interests.7 They believe 
that this law reform, in turn, will normatively “signal[] that certain, presently 
unrecognized aspects of children’s lives should be valued by society,”8 as law has 
the power to “shape multiple aspects of children’s lives.”9 Theirs is thus a top-
down approach to change: by extending the Constitution to safeguard more ro-
bust rights for children in a way that “values children as full persons with broad 
interests and rights of their own,” our communities will also come to embrace 
and respect children as such beings.10 
The article presents a compelling case for reform. It details the many ways in 
which our current legal scheme imposes a myopic frame on children, viewing 
them on a one-dimensional continuum from dependency to autonomy.11 Their 
proposed fix is fresh and innovative, making a real contribution to scholarly con-
versations about children and the law. However, because their framework de-
mands broad constitutional reform, unabashedly reflecting “a direct departure 
from existing constitutional law,”12 actual implementation of their new paradigm 
 
it seems plain that children generally have less liberty than adults . . . .”); see also Anne C. Dai-
ley and Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L. J. 1448, 1456 & nn.10 & 13 
(2018) (noting the field’s classic dynamic of competition between parents and the state over 
control of children). 
4. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1451. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.   
7. As they explain, the new law of the child necessarily requires overturning or revising the vast 
body of Supreme Court precedent that contours the current field of children and the law. Id. 
at 1454 (“The new law of the child thus lays the foundation for revising or overruling many 
foundational Supreme Court decisions . . . .”). 
8. Id. at 1455. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1483; see also id. at 1455 (explaining that law reform via the new law of the child will 
“encourage new ways of living for both children and adults”). 
11. Id. at 1467-70 (describing the focus “on the developmental arc from dependency to autonomy 
to the exclusion of other meaningful aspects of children’s lives”). 
12. Id. at 1453. 
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is ultimately quixotic. Moreover, even if their framework were somehow adopted 
in principle, it would disappoint in practice because, by design, it relies heavily 
on the state to vindicate children’s rights, either through state enforcement ac-
tions or through lawsuits against or involving the state.13 As such, when played 
out, the framework necessarily maintains the same troubling dynamic the article 
describes between parents and state officials now who wrangle for control over 
children.14 Moreover, given that states struggle presently to fulfill their obliga-
tions towards children, piling on new responsibilities seems unwise. 
This Response submits that, rather than force change through a constitu-
tional hammer as Dailey and Rosenbury propose, a more practical and effective 
path forward to alter our cultural narrative and achieve the article’s goal of valu-
ing and respecting children as children is through a youth-led approach. Youth-
driven efforts within our current framework, rather than widespread constitu-
tional reform directed by adults, are more likely to produce real changes to the 
ways in which society views, honors, and treats children. Such a method allows 
youth to self-select the issues and interests that matter to them, promotes their 
agency, and capitalizes on their effectiveness as change-agents specifically be-
cause of their youth. 
Part I of this Response provides a brief overview of Dailey and Rosenbury’s 
thoughtful accounting of the present field of children and the law, which they 
term the “authorities framework,”15 and their proposed reconfiguration under 
the new law of the child, where relationships would be valued, parents and state 
actors would have responsibilities, and children would possess affirmative rights 
and a mechanism for enforcement against the state. Part II takes the article at 
face value and details the presumable steps required to effectuate the new tripar-
tite framework, which are unlikely to happen in the near (or distant) future. Part 
III sets aside the hurdles of actually creating new constitutional rights for chil-
dren and assumes the adoption of the new law of the child, analyzing the frame-
work in action. It shows that some aspects might be seamless to institute, while 
others would be both hard to implement and likely to yield disappointing re-
sults. 
Part IV offers an alternative, youth-driven approach to achieving at least 
some of the new law of the child’s important aims. To the extent the article’s 
 
13. See, e.g., id. at 1530 (explaining that, under the framework, children can protect their rights to 
“custodial care, education, safety inside and outside the home, and rehabilitation in the juve-
nile justice system” through state agency enforcement actions, ongoing litigation where the 
state is already involved and where judges will weigh children’s interests, or affirmative litiga-
tion that they bring against the state); see also id. 1528-32 (articulating children’s rights under 
the new framework). For further explanation, see infra Part III. 
14. See id. at 1454-55. 
15. Id. at 1457. 
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ultimate hope is to change our culture’s view of children—to see them as valuable 
members of society in their own right, with worthy relationships, ideas, and 
identities—this Response suggests that we foster that new perspective through 
efforts at the community level that children steer. Such efforts admittedly will 
not create constitutionally protectable rights, but they could achieve many of the 
same ends that the article advances, and by a means that actually demonstrates 
children’s real value and agency. Moreover, this grassroots, child-directed ap-
proach might help create a groundswell that could lead to broader law reform in 
the future. 
i .  the authorities framework and the new law of the 
child 
The dominant narrative about how we currently conceptualize the field of 
children and the law ultimately boils down to analyzing the negotiation of rights 
and responsibilities among children, parents, and the state.16 As the article ex-
plains, this understanding reflects a triangulation with parents and the govern-
ment at the top points of a triangle, trading control over children, who are situ-
ated at the bottom point.17 Children’s dependency justifies this prevailing set-
up.18 Accordingly, as children mature, the triangle starts to shi�, until children 
reach the age of majority, thereby triggering full-on adult autonomy rights and 
all their attendant features. 
Dailey and Rosenbury want to scrap this model, which they coin the author-
ities framework. First, they outline its dubious historical roots, detailing how the 
doctrine evolved from property theory—where parents (more accurately, fa-
thers) controlled every aspect of a child’s life—to the rise of parens patriae and 
 
16. Id. at 1457-67; see e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: 
DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2003) (noting “the delicate interrelationships of 
rights and responsibilities among children, parents, and the government” as a major theme 
in the field). 
17. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1456; see e.g., MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 2-
3; Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 833-34, 833 n.1 (2007). 
Indeed, several law schools term their family law course some iteration of Child, Family, and 
State, reflecting this triangulation. See, e.g., Harvard Law School (“Child, Family and State”); 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law (“Child, Parent and State”), Georgetown Law 
(Family Law II: “Child, Parent, and the State”). 
18. Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1457. 
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the state’s claimed duty to specially protect children.19 They then expose its in-
coherence: the field is a patchwork of bright-line age-based tests,20 subjective 
judicial determinations,21 and limited adult-like rights.22 But most problematic 
is that the authorities framework obscures children’s interests in the “here and 
now” because of its laser-focus on children’s trajectory from dependency to au-
tonomy. 23 Children, however, lead rich and meaningful lives as children: they 
have relationships, identities, ideas, experiences, opinions, and more that the law 
should take into account.24 But because our laws treat children “as lesser versions 
of adult[s],” those interests are eclipsed.25 
In response, the article proposes a provocative and groundbreaking recon-
figuration of the law based on the identification of five normative interests (in 
nonparental relationships, exposure to new ideas, expressions of identity, per-
sonal integrity and privacy, and participation in civic life),26 but which adults, 
namely “courts, legislatures, and scholars,” may further debate and revise.27 They 
then organize these interests into a tripartite framework of relationships, respon-
sibilities, and rights. The first arm recognizes children’s relationships that merit 
legal support.28 These include relationships with parents, but also extend to 
other adults, such as relatives, teachers, mentors, coaches, doctors, lawyers, and 
therapists; and with other children, including siblings and peers.29 
The second arm details the legal responsibilities that adults—both parents 
and state actors—would have to further children’s broader interests.30 For exam-
ple, under the new framework, parents would still be tasked with children’s care-
giving and protection, but states would also be required to better support par-
ents in this duty by providing more extensive social services.31 Additionally, both 
 
19. Id. at 1457-59. 
20. Id. at 1465 (laws concerning driving, drinking, employment, sexual activity, and criminal 
prosecution). 
21. See id. at 1461 nn.35 & 36 (noting, for example, that courts may consider a child’s wishes in 
custody and other family disputes and when evaluating a child’s health care decisions). 
22. Id. at 1464 (e.g., free speech and due process). 
23. Id. at 1467. 
24. Id. at 1468. 
25. Id. at 1451. 
26. See id. at 1484. 
27. Id. at 1478. 
28. Id. at 1507, 1508-14. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1515-27. 
31. Id. at 1516-19. 
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parents and states would be required to foster children’s education.32 Parents 
would be obligated to expose children to ideas outside the home, most concretely 
by not homeschooling their children,33 and states would have an affirmative duty 
to provide meaningful, high-quality education including free daycare and pre-
school.34 Parent and state responsibilities would also mean, for instance, that 
states would “interrogate” parental bodily intrusions like circumcision and sur-
gery for intersex infants, which undermine children’s interests in bodily integrity 
among other things.35 Further, both parents and states would need to treat chil-
dren’s misconduct through the lens of rehabilitation.36 Corporal punishment 
would be effectively prohibited and juvenile justice systems would need to com-
mit fully to rehabilitating system-involved youth.37 Lastly, parents and states 
would be tasked with “further[ing] children’s engagement as members of the 
broader society” via work, volunteerism, sports, political action, and more.38 
This would require both parents and states to facilitate children’s engagement by 
providing both the opportunities and the access to them, meaning everything 
from transportation to state-funded reproductive healthcare.39 
The third arm announces the rights children would have to safeguard their 
interests. Under the framework “[n]ot all adult responsibilities will give rise to 
affirmative rights enforceable by children. But many will.”40 Indeed, the article 
rejects the Supreme Court’s express pronouncement in Deshaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services that children have no affirmative constitu-
tional rights.41 Rather, under the new law of the child, children would have af-
 
32. Id. at 1521. 
33. Id. at 1522-23. 
34. Id. at 1521-22. 
35. Id. at 1518. 
36. Id. at 1523-25. 
37. Id. at 1523-24. 
38. Id. at 1526-27. 
39. Id. at 1526 (noting parental and state obligations to help children overcome concrete barriers 
to participation includes access to reproductive healthcare because “older children’s ability to 
attend school, to work, and to participate in political activities o�en turns on meaningful ac-
cess to such care”). 
40. Id. at 1530. 
41. Id. at 1453, 1529; see also Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989) (“[The Due Process Clause] forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, lib-
erty, or property without ‘due process of law,’ but its language cannot fairly be extended to 
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to 
harm through other means.”). The article asserts that Deshaney was wrongly decided because 
it relied on cases that rejected adult affirmative constitutional rights and neglected to consider 
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firmative federal constitutional rights to custodial care, education, safety, and re-
habilitation, and perhaps also to relationships, exposure to ideas, and access to 
play, sports, creative arts, and other activities.42 The article posits that under the 
framework, a judge might weigh these interests when undergoing a “best inter-
est of the child” analysis in an ongoing proceeding.43 In other contexts, however, 
the article envisions state enforcement actions against parents for failing to 
honor children’s rights (presumably ones children could trigger by filing a com-
plaint with the appropriate state agency).44 It also anticipates children initiating 
legal proceedings against the state for failing to uphold its affirmative duties 
(and presumably, for failing to prevent parents from failing to uphold their af-
firmative duties, too).45 The article additionally fleshes out children’s autonomy, 
equality, and other rights, including perhaps even the right to vote.46 
The new law of the child thus offers a blueprint for a radical reworking of 
the law, which Dailey and Rosenbury believe will better protect and promote 
children’s wide-ranging interests, and ultimately transform our culture’s under-
standing and views about youth.47 Although the new framework is exciting from 
a theoretical perspective, its approach to change—through widespread constitu-
tional reform—makes actual implementation doubtful. 
i i .  the steps needed to effectuate the new law of the child 
The article is quick to concede that many rights under the new law of the 
child do not exist under our current constitutional doctrine.48 Indeed, in addi-
tion to Deshaney, a slew of other Supreme Court cases touching on children 
would also need to be greatly revised or overturned. These include, among oth-
ers, cases: affirming parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of their children, 
 
whether children—wholly different than adults—have affirmative constitutional rights. See 
Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1529-30. 
42. Id. at 1530. 
43. Id. at 1479; see also 1452, 1469-70, 1512-13, 1533. 
44. Id. at 1534. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1528-36. 
47. See, e.g., id. at 1451-56. 
48. Id. at 1528 (“Some of these rights exist under current constitutional doctrine, but many do 
not.”); see also id. at 1453-54. 
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and, with that, restrict their children’s relationships with others;49 limiting chil-
dren’s (and adults’) rights to sue for services;50 denying children a fundamental 
right to education;51 restricting student speech in schools;52 condoning corporal 
punishment;53 permitting drug testing in schools;54 allowing school officials to 
search a student’s property;55 and upholding a state’s right to try a child as an 
adult.56 The framework also seemingly implicates, for example, cases deciding 
 
49. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a compulsory education 
statute); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down statute requiring all 
children to attend public school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a 
state statute prohibiting foreign-language instruction); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57 (2000) (finding unconstitutional a state statute permitting third parties to petition for vis-
itation with children over the parent’s objection); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 504 U.S. 905 
(1992) (finding that biological fathers have no constitutionally protected rights to a relation-
ship with their children when a mother remarries, and children have no right to a relationship 
with the biological fathers). 
50. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (finding no congressional intent to allow the 
private enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, thus determining that 
children could not sue for enforcement); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (find-
ing that states are not required to fund abortions otherwise not reimbursable under Medicaid 
due to the Hyde Amendment, which restricts the use of federal funds for abortion). Harris v. 
McRae would either need to be reversed or severely limited to find a teenager’s right to a state-
funded abortion. 
51. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
52. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
53. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (allowing corporal punishment in schools). 
54. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (finding the mandatory 
drug testing of public school students participating in extracurricular activities to be consti-
tutional); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (finding the random drug 
testing of student athletes to be constitutional). 
55. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (permitting school officials to conduct warrantless 
searches upon “reasonable suspicion” that a student violated the law or a school rule). Alt-
hough T.L.O. recognizes that children have some privacy rights, it is likely that the new law 
of the child would still require a re-reading of this case to better capture children’s privacy 
interests (among others), particularly since the ruling relies on a standard lower than probable 
cause and allows for searches upon suspicion that a student violated “even the most trivial 
school regulation.” See id. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (finding a minor may be tried and punished as an 
adult based on an evaluation of various factors including the seriousness of the crime, the 
minor’s age, and the minor’s criminal background and mental state). Although Kent affords 
children specific procedural safeguards before a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction over 
them, it is likely that the new law of the child would still require a re-reading of this case 
perhaps to find any waiver unconstitutional. Alternatively, the new law of the child might find 
Kent troubling because it triggered “automatic waiver” statutes and “prosecutorial waiver” 
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parental and other caregiver due process rights in child welfare proceedings57 as 
well as cases concerning federal child welfare statutes like the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act.58 As such, a full-throttled, comprehensive litigation strategy to reread 
or reverse these and other Supreme Court decisions would be necessary to actu-
ally bring the new framework to life. Alternatively, a new constitutional amend-
ment would be required. As explained below, neither approach seems achievable 
in the near, or perhaps even distant, future. 
Widespread law reform through strategic litigation can certainly alter or re-
verse Supreme Court precedent that fails to recognize sought-a�er constitu-
tional rights. For example, the NAACP’s campaign to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson 
and the “separate but equal” regime that condoned racial segregation began in 
the mid-1920s and, through a series of structured test cases, culminated in Brown 
v. Board of Education in 1954, which found that “in the field of education the doc-
trine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”59 Similarly, gay rights advocates fought 
for decades to attain relationship equality, initially challenging state sodomy laws 
through impact litigation and culminating with a federal constitutional right to 
marry.60 
But impact litigation campaigns meant to destabilize existing legal regimes 
face significant hurdles. First, overturning or dramatically revising precedent is 
hard. Stare decisis tethers lower courts to past Supreme Court rulings, and it 
cabins the Supreme Court from departing except for limited and justifiable rea-
sons,61 assuming the Court even grants plenary review, which occurs only one 
 
practices where juveniles are automatically transferred to adult criminal court, thereby cir-
cumventing the procedural protections that Kent provides. See MNOOKIN, supra note 3, at 782-
83; Kristin Simms Cross, Commentary: When Juvenile Delinquents Are Treated as Adults: The 
Constitutionality of Alabama’s Automatic Transfer Statute, 50 ALA. L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1998). 
This practice has led to greater numbers of youth being transferred to adult court, o�en at 
increasingly younger ages. MNOOKIN, supra note 3, at 783. 
57. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding indigent parents have no 
due process right to counsel during termination of parental rights proceeding); Smith v. Org. 
of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (finding New York’s procedures 
for removing foster children from foster homes were sufficient). 
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963; see, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013). 
59. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2004) (chronicling 
the litigation strategy in Brown). 
60. See ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE 501-07 (2013); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding 
that same-sex couples have a fundamental constitutional right to marry). 
61. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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percent of the time.62 As such, the Supreme Court will overrule one of its cases 
only if it was wrongly decided, if “a series of prudential and pragmatic consider-
ations” demand overruling, or if a “special justification [requires] departing 
from precedent.”63 To be sure, strategic impact litigation schemes have reversed 
past precedent in the civil and gay rights contexts, among others. But those wins 
were not guaranteed, and their decades-long fights speak to the inherent chal-
lenges of overcoming stare decisis and reforming the Constitution.64 
Further, the change envisioned in the new law of the child is arguably much 
harder to achieve than past wins. Whereas the racial and marriage equality cam-
paigns sought to bring disenfranchised groups to equal status with the majority, 
the new law of the child wants no such thing. Indeed, the article takes pains to 
explain that the new framework does not simply confer adult-like rights on chil-
dren or make children equal to adults.65 Rather, the rights sought under the new 
law of the child are diffuse and dynamic. They are not viewed through the lens 
of freely autonomous adults, and indeed may extend farther than adults’ rights.66 
Accordingly, there is no majority against which to measure children’s new rights: 
there is no clear end-game. This setup thus would force judges not only to cast 
aside large swaths of Supreme Court precedent, such as the cases noted above, 
but also to do so beyond a known bar of what is equal and fair—a seemingly far 
greater reach than other law reform litigation efforts. 
Second, litigation does not in itself yield change on the ground. Favorable 
outcomes are not guaranteed, and even when won, they are simply slips of paper. 
 
62. See Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding Certainty in Cert: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari Decisions from 2001-2015, 61 VILLANOVA L. REV. 
795, 795 (2016). 
63. Steven J. Burton, The Conflict Between Stare Decisis and Overruling in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1687-98 (2014) (explaining Justice Kennedy’s and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinions in Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; quoting the plurality opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); and quoting Justice Sotomayor’s concur-
ring opinion in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)). 
64. See, e.g., CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 60, at 225 (noting an “important limit” to progressive 
public interest litigation is its dependency on receptive courts, which are waning due to the 
“increasing conservatism” on the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, and thus making 
courts “potentially unstable and unreliable institutions for sustaining reform”); TUSHNET, 
supra note 59, at 169 (noting that public interest litigation campaigns died down at the end of 
the twentieth century due to an increasingly conservative bench). 
65. See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1482 (“To be clear, we do not simply seek to 
transfer a regime of adult liberal values on children. Our normative account of children’s in-
terests goes well beyond an understanding of the core values that animate law’s regulation of 
persons more generally.”). 
66. Id. at 1482-83. For example, under the new law of the child, female children would be guar-
anteed a right to a state-funded abortion, even though adult women own no such right. Id. at 
1526. 
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Judgments must be monitored and enforced to have meaning, which o�en 
amounts to a lifetime of battle.67 Subsequent lawsuits, contempt actions, and 
other advocacy is routinely needed to make judgments stick.68 Indeed, Thurgood 
Marshall, who shepherded Brown to success, is quoted as saying to those cele-
brating its victory: “You fools go ahead and have your fun, but we ain’t begun to 
work yet.”69 Post-Brown litigation reflects this reality: decades of lawsuits have 
ensued to try to eradicate segregation in our schools, which continues to this 
day.70 As such, even if lawyers were able to secure reversals and reinterpretations 
of past Supreme Court precedent governing children, such wins would not in 
themselves bring about the societal change the article envisions to honor chil-
dren in the here and now. 
Lastly, litigation can lead to client disempowerment and provoke widespread 
backlash that undermines gains. Because litigation necessarily requires a lawyer’s 
specialized skills, education, and access, an inherent imbalance exists between 
lawyers and clients.71 This is especially so when lawyers advocate on behalf of 
marginalized groups that society already sidelines,72 and especially children, who 
are by nature dependent on adults.73 Additionally, litigation that aims to change 
our culture, as the article envisions, can spark a counter-mobilization move-
ment.74 For example, Roe v. Wade, although undoubtedly a hallmark of women’s 
rights, is also criticized, most notoriously by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for 
sparking a far-reaching right-wing movement to erode the decision.75 Similar 
 
67. See, e.g., CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 60, at 226-27; TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 143-44; 
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History, 66 
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 26 (2004). 
68. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 60, at 216, 226-27. 
69. Bell, supra note 67, at 25. 
70. Bell, supra note 67, at 26. Children’s Rights, a leading nonprofit focused on reforming child 
welfare systems through impact litigation, also highlights this. Of their thirteen open cases, 
ten are in the monitoring phase, some of which reflect settlements dating back 25 years. Chil-
dren’s Rights responsibly considers monitoring a central part of its strategy to bring about 
reform, but the fact that such intensive monitoring is necessary demonstrates the real struggle 
in effectuating legally recognized rights. See Class Actions, CHILD. RTS., http://www.chil-
drensrights.org/our-campaigns/class-actions [http://perma.cc/X5C7-TAZ9]. 
71. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 60, at 222. 
72. Id. at 223. 
73. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Lawyering in Juvenile Court: Lessons from a Civil Gideon Ex-
periment, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 93-96, 104, 107-10 (discussing lawyers’ resistance to cli-
ent-centered representation of children because of entrenched notions that children are not 
capable of making rational decisions for themselves). 
74. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 60, at 229. 
75. See, e.g. Justice Ginsburg on How She Thinks Roe v. Wade Should Have Been Decided Differently, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2016, 10:11 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national
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backlash occurred in the gay rights movement in 2003, where Lawrence v. Texas 
decriminalized sodomy laws and subsequently led to thirteen state constitutional 
amendments defining marriage as between a man and a woman.76 The new law 
of the child might marshal even broader resistance, as backlash would likely 
spring from both ends of the political spectrum. Conservatives would likely chal-
lenge extensions of children’s rights for fear that doing so undermines parental 
sovereignty—the same reason they have staunchly opposed ratifying the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.77 Liberals might oppose the new frame-
work for fear that it may undercut women’s rights, particularly rights of single-
mothers to make choices for their children and perhaps even adult women’s 
abortion rights.78 The Jewish community would also likely oppose the frame-
work, at least to the extent it prohibits circumcision.79 As such, if the new law of 
the child were to gain momentum in the courts, states might counter with a 
surge of laws buoyed by bipartisan support aimed at strengthening parental con-
trol. 
In view of these challenges, advocates might attempt an alternative tack to 
effectuate the new law of the child through a constitutional amendment, dra�ed 
to hold states accountable to protecting children’s interests and (arguably for the 
 
/justice-ginsburg-on-how-she-thinks-roe-v-wade-should-have-been-decided-differently
/2016/03/02/5c4c7820-e08d-11e5-8c00-8aa03741dced_video.html [http://perma.cc/Q79T 
-UVVK]; Meredith Heagney, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg Offers Critique of Roe v. Wade During 
Law School Visit, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH. (May 15, 2013), http://www.law.uchicago.edu
/news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-offers-critique-roe-v-wade-during-law-school-visit 
[http://perma.cc/H5GB-XXDG]. 
76. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 60, at 501. 
77. See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267 & nn. 
2-3, 269-70 (1995); Amy Rothschild, Is America Holding Out on Protecting Children’s Rights?, 
ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/05/holding-
out-on-childrens-rights/524652 [http://perma.cc/T3V8-YG3E] (noting conservative opposi-
tion to the Convention on the Rights of the Child); see also, e.g., S. Res. 99, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(explaining that the Convention would supplant parental authority and therefore should not 
be ratified, as sponsored by then South Carolina Republican Senator Jim DeMint). 
78. Indeed, women’s rights advocates might find offensive that the new law of the child would 
protect a child’s right to a free, state-funded abortion, even though an adult woman owns no 
such right. See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1526. Such advocates might also voice 
concern that children’s rights might attach in utero and restrict a woman’s access to abortion. 
Cf. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND 
THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 229-30 (1999) (noting pro-choice advocates’ concerns about at-
tempts to control substance abuse during pregnancy, against child-rights advocates who seek 
to protect children from substance effects); Minow, supra note 77, at 283-87 & n.101 (noting 
the complicated and sometimes hostile relationship between the women’s right and children’s 
rights movements). 
79. See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1518. 
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first time) positive rights.80 A well-cra�ed amendment could theoretically effec-
tuate the new law of the child and reverse Supreme Court precedent—such an 
amendment would not be the first aimed at negating past Supreme Court deci-
sions.81 But this approach is even more doomed to fail. The U.S. Constitution is 
one of the most difficult in the world to alter.82 Change is possible, but only with 
significant effort and near unanimity in view of Article V’s requirements for two 
supermajorities at both the federal and state level.83 Indeed, Justice Scalia once 
calculated that it would take fewer than two percent of the population to prevent 
a constitutional amendment.84 As such, no one should pin their hopes of law 
 
80. Scholars debate whether or not “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive 
liberties.” Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). Compare, 
e.g., id. (asserting that the federal Constitution does not afford citizens positive rights), with 
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Right, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886-90 
(1986) (arguing that while Posner is generally correct that the Constitution protects negative 
liberties, the Constitution may also be read as imposing certain positive duties). 
81. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (superseding Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 
(1793)); id. amends. XIII, XIV (superseding Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)). 
Recent efforts include a constitutional amendment to supersede Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See, e.g., Getting Big Money Out of Politics and  
Restoring Democracy, BERNIE, http://berniesanders.com/issues/money-in-politics [http://
perma.cc/9GEM-Z2Z8]. In his last book, Justice John Paul Stevens proposed six constitu-
tional amendments that would supersede various Supreme Court decisions. JOHN PAUL STE-
VENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION (2014). 
82. Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172 (1995); see also 
Eric Posner, The U.S. Constitution Is Impossible To Amend, SLATE (May 5, 2014, 4:22 PM) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending
_the_constitution_is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html [http://perma.cc/TGK9
-2AY8] (noting the U.S. Constitution is “an outlier” compared to most other liberal democ-
racies that amend their constitutions fairly frequently, sometimes even yearly). 
83. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Under Article V, an amendment may be proposed only if two-thirds of 
each House of Congress vote in favor of it and then three-quarters of the states ratify it. Id. 
Alternatively, two-thirds of state legislatures can vote for a Constitutional Convention, where 
an amendment is proposed and then adopted if, again, three-quarters of the states ratify it. 
Id. The former route has occurred twenty-seven times in history (really only eighteen, since 
the Bill of Rights was adopted all at once in 1791). See id. amends. I-XXVII; see also Griffin, 
supra note 82, at 172 (noting that the Constitution has been amended so infrequently because 
“Article V comes close to requiring unanimity to approve any amendment as a practical mat-
ter). The latter route, never. See STEVENS, supra note 81, at 4; Michael B. Rappaport and David 
A. Strauss, Common Interpretation, CONST. CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/articles/article-v/article-v-by-michael-b-rappaport-and-david 
-a-strauss/interp/22 [http://perma.cc/Q2C8-HR6L]. 
84. Debra Cassens Weiss, How Scalia and Ginsberg Would Amend the Constitution, ABA J. (Apr. 21, 
2014, 11:30 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_scalia_and_gins-
burg_would_amend_the_constitution [http://perma.cc/446S-9HLE]. 
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reform on this method.85 Consider the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), one of 
the most recent near misses. The ERA soared through both houses of Congress 
in the early 1970s,86 but failed (and continues to fail) to achieve ratification from 
thirty-eight states.87 Defeat occurred despite there being a comprehensive and 
concerted campaign for passage, building on the momentum of the women’s 
rights movement in the 1960s.88 Even though Congress granted a ratification 
extension beyond the now conventional seven-year limit,89 the ERA still did not 
come to fruition. The ERA has been reintroduced to Congress every year since 
1982 to no avail.90 As such, the possibility of an amendment bringing to life the 
new law of the child seems remote. In view of these practical obstacles towards 
implementation, the new law of the child seems more poised for scholarly debate 
rather than a means to actual change. 
i i i . the new law of the child in practice 
But let’s assume that the new law of the child improbably becomes the law 
of the land. States would then need to develop mechanisms to give effect to chil-
dren’s new rights. Some newfound rights might be integrated seamlessly into 
state codes. For example, states could simply pass legislation that would outlaw 
homeschooling, so as to protect children’s interests in exposure to new ideas.91 
 
85. Even an advocate for the Equal Rights Amendment confessed that she “was not surprised” 
when the amendment failed, as she “knew from the beginning” how difficult the Constitution 
is to amend. Mary Frances Berry, Amending the Constitution; How Hard It Is to Change, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/13/magazine/amending-the-con-
stitution-how-hard-it-is-to-change.html [http://perma.cc/CBK7-5KEN]. 
86. 118 Cong. Rec. 9,598 (1972) (counting 84 senators in favor); 117 Cong. Rec. 35,815 (1971) 
(counting 354 House members in favor). 
87. Alexander White, Keep ‘Em Separated: Article I, Article V, and Congress’s Limited and Defined 
Role in the Process of Amending the Constitution, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1075 n.137 (2013). ERA 
legislation continues to be introduced, as recently as last year, but passage has still yet to occur. 
See, e.g., S.J. Res. 6, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 33, 115th Cong. (2017). 
88. Roberta W. Francis, The History Behind the Equal Rights Amendment, EQUAL RTS. AMEND., 
http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/history.htm [http://perma.cc/UUG9-R4GP]. 
89. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 6 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE 
& PROCEDURE, app. M (6th ed. 2017) (“Beginning with the proposed Eighteenth Amendment, 
Congress has customarily included a provision requiring ratification within seven years from 
the time of the submission to the States.”). 
90. See Francis, supra note 88. 
91. This aspect, however, reflects one of the authors’ most extreme positions, and is seemingly 
contrary to the ethos of their new framework. The article envisions a categorical ban on home-
schooling for secondary school children, see Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1522-23, with-
out any consideration of the individual child’s circumstances. Although the authors claim that 
the new law of the child “embrac[es] diversity” among children, id. at 1478, and acknowledges 
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They could additionally outlaw circumcision and intersex surgeries, and strip 
licenses for doctors who perform them. States could also enact laws prohibiting 
corporal punishment to protect a child’s bodily integrity, and adopt key juvenile 
justice reforms to meet states’ responsibilities towards rehabilitation. 
The article’s five interests could also be introduced into the family law con-
text without much heavy li�ing. As the article contemplates, states could simply 
require courts to incorporate the new interests into their “best interests of the 
child” analysis, which all states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia 
already use when deciding various actions implicating children.92 In fact, many 
state statutes already account for at least some of them. Twenty-eight states ref-
erence avoiding removal of the child from his or her home, thereby recognizing 
a child’s relationship with non-parental adults and children,93 and twenty-one 
states specify that courts should consider the relationships between children and 
their siblings, family, household members, and/or other caregivers when mak-
ing decisions.94 With respect to children’s autonomy and other interests, twelve 
states and the District of Columbia already require courts to consider a child’s 
wishes when undergoing a “best interests” determination.95 
Moreover, at least seventeen states direct courts to consider all relevant fac-
tors, even those not articulated in their statutes, such that courts in these states 
can already weigh children’s broader interests in their decisions.96 Indeed, a Mas-
sachusetts court recently did just that. In In re Adoption of Odetta, a court granted 
post-adoption visitation rights to a child’s paternal uncle, although he was not 
explicitly covered by statute.97 A�er the father, who was Muslim, killed the 
mother, who was Christian, and lost his parental rights, the child was placed 
with her maternal aunt and uncle.98 The court held—and the appeals court af-
firmed—that visitation with the paternal uncle was in the child’s best interests as 
it would further her contact with her father’s side of the family and continue her 
 
that children’s interests vary and are “deeply situational,” id. at 1468, they take an incompatible 
position in refusing to acknowledge that homeschooling might in some circumstances serve 
a child’s broader interests. 
92. See id. at 1452; Determining the Best Interests of the Child, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf [http://perma.cc/EB8E-A6PB]. 
93. See Determining the Best Interests of the Child, supra note 92, at 2 & n.1. 
94. See id. at 2 & n.6, 3 & n.15. 
95. See id. at 3 & n.16. 
96. See id. at 2 & n.12 (listing fourteen states whose statutes do not require courts to consider only 
the specified factors). Additionally, three states require courts to consider “any other factor” 
or “other factors” relevant to the decision. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-26(20) (2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 722.23(l) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2012). 
97. See In re Adoption of Odetta, 32 N.E.3d 1277, 1279 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). 
98. Id. at 1279-80. 
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exposure to her Muslim religion and culture, thereby respecting her interests in 
the relationship, her exposure to new ideas, and her expressions of identity.99 
Similarly, an Alabama appellate court affirmed visitation with an aunt and uncle, 
absent a statutory right to it, and let stand an order not to homeschool the chil-
dren for at least one year.100 The court found such a ruling was based on the 
children’s best interests, including their interests in maintaining ties to their de-
ceased mother’s family, relationships with their peers, and involvement in extra-
curricular activities.101 
But even though some aspects of the framework might be relatively easy to 
administer, others prove unadvisable at best and unimaginable at worst. To play 
out one scenario under the new model, an aggrieved child would be able to file 
a complaint with a state agency to investigate her parents’ alleged failure to sat-
isfy their duties in, for example, her education, by insufficiently exposing her to 
new ideas outside of the home.102 Assuming the state adopts an enforcement 
model similar to that used in the child welfare context, the state would then pre-
sumably open an investigation and send a social worker to the home to interview 
the parents and child, make observations, and write a report. The complaint 
might be found unsubstantiated and “screened out,” or substantiated and 
“screened in.” If substantiated, presumably the state would provide various sup-
ports to help the parents fulfill their obligations. If the parents nonetheless failed 
to improve, the state might take more coercive actions, including court interven-
tion. 
Alternatively, the article anticipates that the child might be able to file a law-
suit to vindicate her rights. Since the child’s rights are grounded in the Consti-
tution, the suit would necessarily be against the state and not her parents, who 
are private actors and beyond the Constitution’s reach.103 Presumably then, a suit 
could involve not only the state’s failure to uphold its primary obligation to pro-
 
99. Id. at 1279-83. Although the article casts the Best Interest of the Child analysis as an exercise 
of “unprincipled judicial discretion,” Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1452, lawyers o�en 
rely on a judge’s discretion and “broad equitable powers,” see Odetta, 32 N.E.3d at 1280, to 
advocate for recognition of child’s broader interests. 
100. D.B. v. K.B., 67 So. 3d 114, 119-21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). 
101. Id. at 116-17. There, the juvenile court ordered the aunt not to home school the children for a 
minimum of one year because they were “accustomed to going to a public school and being 
involved in both classes with other non-related children and in public school related extracur-
ricular activities.” Id. at 116. The aunt argued the ruling was unconstitutional, but the appeals 
court found that issue not properly raised. Id. at 117. One judge in concurrence found the 
homeschooling prohibition constitutional on the merits. 
102. See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1530 (contemplating agency action to vindicate chil-
dren’s rights). 
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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vide an education, but also its failure to uphold its secondary obligation to pre-
vent parents from failing to uphold their primary obligation to provide an edu-
cation. 
Both scenarios expose inherent defects of the new law of the child. First, at a 
fundamental level, the new framework reinforces—rather than abandons—our 
current triangular model where parents and the state battle for decision-making 
authority over children. A child unhappy with her parents’ actions can pull the 
state lever and initiate an investigation or a lawsuit. In turn, the state will either 
vindicate the parent, or vindicate the child, but ultimately still remain the final 
arbiter when a conflict arises. The field will not be recentered. Rather, all the 
same players will still fight for control. The framework cannot escape this trian-
gulation because the rights are constitutional and are therefore bound up with 
state action. 
Second, the framework necessarily foists numerous new affirmative respon-
sibilities on the state to protect and promote children’s rights in the areas of (at 
least) caregiving and protection, education, rehabilitation, and civil engage-
ment.104 This is unwise. To begin, states have a remarkably poor track record of 
safeguarding children’s rights and interests as currently conceived, let alone as 
reimagined. For instance, in the child welfare context, states generally fail to ad-
equately address and prevent child abuse and neglect.105 The federal Department 
of Health and Human Services estimates that, on our states’ watch, 1,750 chil-
dren died from abuse and neglect in 2016, reflecting an average of five children 
per day and a 7.4% increase from 2012.106 An estimated 3.5 million children re-
ceived a child protective services investigation or alternative response, an uptick 
of 9.5% in the past five years, and 676,000 children are estimated to have suf-
fered from abuse and neglect in 2016.107 The ongoing opioid crisis seems to have 
only made matters worse, having an “immeasurable” impact on our child welfare 
systems, as states report exponential increases in the number of children placed 
 
104. See Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1515-27. 
105. See generally Children’s Advocacy Inst., Shame on U.S.: Failings by All Three Branches of Our 
Federal Government Leave Abused and Neglected Children Vulnerable to Further Harm, U.  
SAN DIEGO SCH. L., http://www.firststar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Shame-on-U.S.
_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/D3SU-Z4XR] (arguing that all three branches of the federal 
government and the states have failed to adequately protect abused and neglected children); 
see also, e.g., Tom Morton, The Pernicious Failure of Child Welfare Reform, CHRONICAL OF SOC. 
CHANGE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/pernicious 
-failure-child-welfare-reform [http://perma.cc/5677-7L68] (identifying the structural faults 
in child welfare agencies). 
106. Admin. for Children & Families, Child Maltreatment 2016, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.  
SERVICES 54, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2016.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6V6Q-WPJW]. 
107. Id. at 17, 18. 
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in foster care.108 Various federal laws,109 state laws,110 and programs111 exist to 
curtail these rising statistics to no avail, vexing federal and state governments 
alike. 
States also fail children in the education context, another sphere of state con-
trol. The United States lags in student achievement compared to other nations, 
based on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test, 
which measures the academic performance of fi�een-year-old students around 
the globe.112 The most recent results show that the United States ranks, out of 
seventy-three countries: fortieth in math, twenty-fi�h in science, and twenty-
fourth in reading.113 Our students are stagnating or falling further behind their 
international peers compared to previous years’ PISA results, demonstrating a 
decline in our states’ abilities to educate our youth.114 In view of state failures in 
the child welfare and education contexts, adding new state responsibilities, in-
cluding expanded obligations in these two areas, seems likely unproductive. 
 
108. Substance Abuse and Child Welfare Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/substance-abuse-and-child-welfare 
-resources.aspx [http://perma.cc/X873-L82D]; see also, e.g., Sherry Lachman, Opinion, The 
Opioid Plague’s Youngest Victims: Children in Foster Care, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), http://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/opinion/opioid-crisis-children-foster-care.html [http://
perma.cc/4Z8S-YUMX] (reporting that since 2010, the number of children in foster care has 
doubled in Montana, increased by eighty percent in Georgia, and increased by forty-five per-
cent in West Virginia). 
109. See, e.g., The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 
4; The Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–36, 117 Stat. 800; see 
also Major Federal Legislation Concerned with Child Protection, Child Welfare, and Adoption, 
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (March 2015), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/ma-
jorfedlegis.pdf [http://perma.cc/NX4H-TLUE] (providing an overview of child protective 
legislation at the federal level). 
110. For a compilation of state laws, see State Statutes Search, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/laws-policies/state [http://perma.cc
/D6XG-LXJB]. 
111. Prevention Programs, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, http://www.childwelfare.gov/topics
/preventing/prevention-programs [http://perma.cc/C9W8-U2AX]. 
112. PISA 2015 Results (Volume 1): Excellence and Equity in Education, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERA-
TION & DEV. 25 (2016), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/9816061e
.pdf?expires=1520466916&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=6CF4D9B4381F297246B6865
DE730E881 [http://perma.cc/UL4Z-F5YS]. 
113. Id. at 149, 177, 207; see Joe Heim, On the World Stage, U.S. Students Fall Behind, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/on-the-world-stage-us 
-students-fall-behind/2016/12/05/610e1e10-b740-11e6-a677-b608�b3aaf6_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/EU3Z-J3CF]. 
114. See Heim, supra note 113. 
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Moreover, satisfaction of states’ new responsibilities under the new law of 
the child would require an immense scaling up of states’ administrative apparat-
uses and would produce a resulting eruption in costs. The new framework would 
call for myriad additional state employees at every level, including social work-
ers, educators, licensors, court personnel, judges, lawyers, administrative offic-
ers, mental health specialists, doctors and other health care providers, juvenile 
detention specialists, parks and recreation staff, transportation workers, accom-
panying support personnel, among countless others. New agencies, buildings, 
offices, parks, transportations systems, programs, health facilities, schools, day-
care centers, juvenile detention facilities, and other structures would be needed 
to carry out the state’s new affirmative duties. Yet, states are in fiscal distress: 
thirty-three were facing real or projected budget gaps for fiscal year 2017-2018, 
amounting to a collective revenue shortfall of $15.9 billion.115 Further, recent 
data show that at the close of the 2017 fiscal year, states’ total balances in their 
general fund budgets would allow them to run operations for a median of only 
29.3 days.116 The United States is an incredibly wealthy society, but it dramati-
cally underfunds social programs. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to 
foresee how the state and federal economies would be restructured to supply the 
qualified human capital and the infrastructure needed to faithfully execute the 
new law of the child. 
iv. a youth-led approach instead 
Rather than orchestrate a widespread lawyer-driven campaign to constitu-
tionalize children’s interests in order to change the ways in which we parent, care 
for, teach, rear, and respect youth—a campaign that seems destined to fail at all 
levels—children would be better served by an alternative, ground-level approach 
that they control and direct. The article proposes forcing change through a 
trickle-down method: if we change our laws, we will in turn change society’s 
limited views of children.117 But laws do not necessarily change society. The 
 
115. State Budget Shortfalls, SFY 2017 and SFY 2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.kff.org
/other/state-indicator/state-budget-shortfalls/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B
%22colId%22:%22Facing%20Shortfalls%20in%20either%20SFY%202017%20or%20SFY
%202018%3F%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [http://perma.cc/Y4CC-EA3H]. 
116. Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www
.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50 [http://perma.cc/9J9N 
-9PHQ]. 
117. See, e.g., Dailey & Rosenbury, supra note 3, at 1478 (discussing how law both reflects and 
shapes reality, and that adopting the new law of the child, which values children’s broader 
interests, will signal to society to value children’s broader interests, too). 
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#MeToo movement is a prime example. Multiple laws, regulations, and Su-
preme Court cases have come down since the 1960s to create a robust legal 
framework that treats women as equal to men.118 And yet sex discrimination 
persists in our offices, paychecks, schools, and communities. Only with the 
#MeToo movement—started, led, and galvanized by women—is our culture fac-
ing a reckoning and accomplishing what the law could not.119 Thus, if the arti-
cle’s real aim is to value children and honor their many dimensions, why not skip 
the constitutional step and simply work at the community level to help children 
achieve this themselves? I propose that, rather than use the article to spark top-
down constitutional reform, we instead use its premise to inspire youth, with 
parents, lawyers, and other adults as support, to produce real change on the 
ground. 
Children across the country are already advocating for our communities to 
fully respect them as they exist now. For example, in Burlington, Vermont, stu-
dents recently petitioned the school board to fly the Black Lives Matter flag on 
its high school campus so as to recognize students of color and create a welcom-
ing space.120 The board passed the measure unanimously, with the support of 
450 students, the principal, and the superintendent.121 Theirs was the second 
community in Vermont to take such action: Montpelier High School did the 
 
118. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d) (2012)) (prohibiting employment discrimination “because 
of . . . sex”); Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 98-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373 (codified 
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally funded schools); 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)) (prohibiting, as discrimination “because of sex,” discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions); Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (protecting women from gen-
der and sexual violence); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980) (EEOC guidelines prohibiting sexual 
harassment in the workplace and finding it to be a form of sex discrimination under Title 
VII); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (finding sexual harassment, in the 
form of a hostile work environment, to be a violation of Title VII); Harris v. Forkli� Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (clarifying the definition of a “hostile work environment” under sex-
ual harassment law); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998) (finding 
employer liability for supervisor sexual harassment); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775 (1998) (same). 
119. Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb 4, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html 
[http://perma.cc/6UV2-XZXZ]. 
120. Nicole Higgins DeSmet, Burlington Students Win Approval to Fly Black Lives Matter Flag, BUR-
LINGTON FREE PRESS (Feb. 13, 2018, 3:41 PM EST), http://www.burlingtonfreepress
.com/story/news/local/vermont/2018/02/13/burlington-students-ask-school-board 
-permission-raise-black-lives-matter-flag-high-school/328510002 [http://perma.cc/4QXE 
-Z9WA]. 
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same weeks earlier a�er an appeal from students the previous year.122 In another 
expression of children’s identity and civic participation, students in Portland, Or-
egon, spoke at a 2015 school board hearing to protest their school’s discrimina-
tory dress code policies, which were unevenly enforced against young women.123 
The school board adopted the students’ recommendation to form a committee 
of students and adults to create a nondiscriminatory gender-neutral dress 
code.124 That code was enacted the following year.125 Students in Evanston, Illi-
nois, got wind of the change and petitioned their own school board to adopt a 
similar measure, adding protections against racially discriminatory dress-code 
enforcement, too.126 It passed in 2017.127 
More recently, since the high-school shooting that killed seventeen people in 
Parkland, Florida in February 2018, youth have mobilized to lead a sweeping and 
unprecedented campaign against gun violence, dubbed #NeverAgain.128 They 
are inspiring youth (and adults) not only in the United States, but around the 
globe, to join in their activism for safe schools.129 #NeverAgain has already or-
chestrated national school walkouts and a historical march on Washington, 
D.C., along with 800 sister marches worldwide.130 The surviving students from 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School have also launched mass lobbying ef-
forts at state houses, rallies, and other events, while also educating voters about 
 
122. AJ Willingham, Why a High School That’s Just 5% Black Is Raising the Black Lives Matter Flag, 
CNN (Feb. 2, 2018, 3:30 PM EST), http://www.cnn.com/2018/02/02/us/black-lives 
-matter-flag-vermont-montpelier-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/NK9D-V6JJ]. 
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HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2017, 4:29 PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
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128. See Arian Campo-Flores & Nicole Hong, How the Florida School Shooting Turned into a Gun-
Control Movement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2018, 3:15 PM EST), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/how-the-florida-school-shooting-turned-into-a-gun-control-movement-1519416915 
[http://perma.cc/DGA8-TDJZ]. 
129. See id.; see also Photos From the “March for Our Lives” Protests Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Mar. 24, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/24/us/photos-march-for 
-lives.html [https://perma.cc/85G3-RFR9] (capturing student-led protests against gun vio-
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130. A�er Parkland Shooting, Worldwide “March for Our Lives,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), http://
www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/03/22/us/ap-us-school-shooting-mobilizing-a 
-movement.html [http://perma.cc/P3EV-SKHZ]; see also Campo-Flores & Hong, supra note 
128 (noting the use of social media in the #NeverAgain movement). 
the yale law journal forum April 30, 2018 
938 
gun control issues.131 They appear regularly on television,132 their activism dom-
inates in the press,133 and their social media accounts have been followed by mil-
lions.134 
Their reform effort is working. Since the shooting, Oregon lawmakers have 
passed gun-control legislation to ban convicted domestic abusers and stalkers 
from buying and owning guns.135 In signing the bill, Governor Kate Brown re-
called the #NeverAgain movement, noting that “the voices and outrage of youth 
devastated by gun violence” spurred the state to act.136 Further, despite deep re-
sistance from the NRA, Florida lawmakers passed a $400 million gun control 
and school safety bill—the first successful gun control law in the state in more 
than twenty years, all because of the #NeverAgain movement.137 Although the 
Stoneman Douglas students sought further reforms, the legislation is still con-
sidered a major victory, raising the minimum age for all gun purchases to 
twenty-one from eighteen, creating a three-day waiting period to purchase guns, 
and banning bump stocks, among other things.138 
Youth advocates and youth movement scholars are not surprised by the 
power of #NeverAgain movement—they believe the movement is formidable 
precisely because youth are leading it.139 As history and research shows, youth 
 
131. See Campo-Flores & Hong, supra note 128. 
132. E.g., Sixty Minutes (CBS television broadcast Mar. 18, 2018) (interviewing Emma González, 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/us/florida-gun-bill.html [http://perma.cc/K8H8 
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2018), http://www.cnn.com/2018/02/21/us/parkland-shooting-youth-social-change/index
.html [http://perma.cc/B27N-P492]. 
top-down or from the ground? 
939 
are effective change agents for a variety of reasons.140 To start, their activism has 
weight because it is passionate, as the issues they advance directly affect them.141 
The Stoneman Douglas students not only speak with rawness and urgency be-
cause of the tragedy the endured; they also make others feel it, too, posting pic-
tures and videos of hiding from the gunman, giving others an inescapable view 
of their reality.142 Their fervent speeches and tweets are unmatchable because 
they originate from first-person accounts, tapping a deep emotional response.143 
Relatedly, because many youth are digital natives, they can de�ly use social me-
dia platforms to mobilize their peers and supporters and counter their critics.144 
Their facility with Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and other outlets allows them 
to directly reach and galvanize other youth, pressure politicians, and ultimately 
influence the democratic process.145 
Collectively, this nationwide advocacy, spanning dress codes to gun control, 
speaks to all of the broader interests that the article articulates, honoring chil-
dren’s relationships, ideas, identities, personal integrity, and participation in 
civic life. But this method of change differs from that advanced in the new law 
of the child: youth—not adults—are the ones prioritizing their interests and is-
sues. Moreover, they are the ones directing the reform, and their successes are 
concrete and real. Our aim should be to spark more of this. 
Adults can buoy youth activism in multiple ways. Perhaps most effectively, 
they can facilitate youth mobilization and organizing efforts, so that children can 
define the issues and interests for which they want to fight and also lead the 
charge in doing so. To that end, adults, including parents, can create spaces to 
bring youth together and unite around the matters affecting them, whether lo-
cally or nationally. They can also consult on strategy and provide needed train-
ings. Such support is helping to sustain the #NeverAgain movement.146 Adult 
organizers of the Women’s March have provided youth activists with back-
ground assistance in planning their walkouts and marches, the marketing firm 
42West has helped students handle public relations, and gun-control advocacy 
groups have partnered with the students to help educate youth about the issue 
 
140. Id.; see also Sasha Costanza-Chock, Youth & Social Movements: Key Lessons for Allies  
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu/files/KBWYouthand
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of youth participation in major social movements). 
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and register them to vote, all with the aim of propelling youth forward on their 
mission for gun regulation.147 
Lawyers can also provide strategic and tactical advice for organized youth, 
educate youth about their rights, offer advice about areas of the law most vul-
nerable to reform efforts, and represent youth or their groups when discrete legal 
issues arise.148 For example, in support of the #NeverAgain movement, the 
ACLU held a “Know Your Rights Training” conference call with students around 
the United States to educate youth about their rights to free speech and expres-
sion in anticipation of planned school walkouts.149 Lawyers can also promote 
children’s lobbying efforts, dra� sample policies or legislation that is supportive 
of the youth’s goals, and assist with media campaigns to bring attention to the 
issues.150 Such behind-the-scenes assistance from lawyers would actually put 
children at the center of a reform movement, rather than adults (as the new law 
of the child does), and allow youth to dictate the changes most meaningful to 
them in their communities. This approach thus helps shi� society’s perceptions 
about youth in two important ways: through the direct effects of youth’s reform 
efforts that promote their interests, which create the policy reforms; and through 
the indirect effects of a method that showcases youth as full people with im-
portant ideas, interests, and identities advancing their own agendas. It may also 
in time spur expanded legal rights. As the marriage equality movement evinces, 
a societal sea change can pave the way to future constitutional reform.151 
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conclusion 
The article represents a revolutionary call to arms to reform the field of chil-
dren and the law, which rests on outdated and limited understandings about 
youth. It articulates the fundamental flaws and conflicts within the current doc-
trine and offers an inventive new framework to break free from the status quo. 
But when actually played out, the framework falters: the steps needed to put it 
in place are unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, and even if adopted would 
not yield the desired outcomes. 
Perhaps the article’s real motivation is simply to spark an academic conver-
sation about what the law could be, without real concern for the mechanics of 
how to get there. But if the conversation is worth having, then so too is actually 
achieving the results. A youth-directed approach that empowers children and 
supports their efforts to achieve their broader interests seems not only more 
likely to produce transformative change, but also more aligned with the article’s 
ultimate purpose to honor and respect children in the here and now. 
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advocacy to advance children’s broader interests. For example, an education lawyer might 
press a school to promote a child-client’s interest in fostering relationships with non-parents 
by adding a line item to an Individual Education Program (IEP) that allows the child to meet 
with a trusted coach or teacher when she feels overwhelmed. She might also advocate for 
certain elective courses that speak to the child’s interest in new ideas, or structured social set-
tings to build the child’s peer relationships. Additionally, a child’s lawyer in a guardianship 
case can use the state’s existing Best Interest factors to honor her client’s broader interests in 
relationships with peers and non-parental adults as part of her strategy in advocating for a 
particular placement. If in a state that allows the evaluation of all factors, she could intention-
ally articulate any of the child’s broader interests for the court’s consideration. 
 
